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Abstract 
Shareholder activism has recently begun to play a significant role in reshaping the corporate governance
of Korean companies. The People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD), a public interest
group, has been at the forefront of leading shareholder activism in Korea. It is believed that PSPD’s
initiatives will have a lasting influence on the Korean legal system governing corporate governance
because for the  first time, various minority shareholders’ rights that had remained dormant for most of
Korea’s modern history have finally been utilized. This Article examines how those involved in
shareholder activism in Korea have been able to use legal measures to improve corporate governance. It
will primarily draw upon the experience of PSPD’s activities in recent years. This article will also
examine the shortcomings that currently exist under the current legal system and will offer some possible
regulatory and policy solutions.
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Efficient and democratic governance will play a significant role for corporations
throughout the world that stand at the center of the industrial mechanism which creates
and distributes wealth and resources. The scale of their operation will increase as they
increase in size for the purposes of engaging in large projects and investments within a
globalized market. As they become more globalized, the comparative corporate
governance shall find the optimal model for harmonized organizational principles.
Peace and human rights in the 21st century cannot be accomplished without fair
domestic and international distribution of material resources produced by the industrial
activities of private corporations worldwide which are, in complement, being
supported by efficient and sound financial institutions and markets. The international
community has learned during the second half of the 20th century that illegal and
illegitimate wealth transfers and inefficient wealth management resulting from poor
corporate governance systems of some developing countries may cause functional
distortions of financial institutions and markets. This can then lead to serious regional
or worldwide financial crises and, as a consequence, jeopardize the balanced
development of the world economy and as well as disrupt the worldwide economic
and social order.174)
International law-making must produce the effect of making financial institutions
and multinational corporations more susceptible to international law rules. For
decades, territorial boundaries have long been meaningless as applied to financial
markets and the activities of multinational corporations. The effective role of
international soft laws, such as the BIS Rules and the OECD Principles, in effecting
such financial and business activities suggests that international organizations and rule-
making bodies will continue to focus on their importance well into the future.
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174) A recent empirical study showed that “the weakness of legal institutions for corporate governance had an
important effect on the extent of depreciations and stock market declines in the Asian crisis.” SeeSimon Johnson, Peter
Boone, Alasdair Breach & Eric Friedman, Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis, 58 J. Fin. Econ. 141,
142 (2000). See also id. at 184 (“In cross-country regressions, corporate governance variables explain more of the
variation in exchange rates and stock market performance during the Asian crisis than do macroeconomic variables.”)
I. Introduction
Shareholder activism has recently begun to play a significant role in reshaping the
corporate governance of Korean companies.1) In many advanced countries, institutional
investors or financial intermediaries are the monitors that serve the function of active
shareholders.2) By contrast, in Korea, shareholder activism was virtually nonexistent in
any form until it was initiated in early 1997 by the People’s Solidarity for Participatory
Democracy (“PSPD”), an influential public interest group.3) PSPD’s minority
shareholder campaign first targeted Korea First Bank and has since then expanded its
activities to Korea’s premier companies such as Samsung Electronics, SK Telecom
and Hyundai Heavy Industries by annually announcing a target company list. These
companies were selectively chosen because it was believed that as Korea’s leading
companies it was critical for them to reform their corporate governance first because
they could serve as models for other companies to follow.
Since that time PSPD has been at the forefront of leading shareholder activism in
Korea. PSPD’s shareholder activities have had a considerable impact including
contributing to increased transparency between business and political relations. But
1) Shareholder activism is a way that shareholders can claim their power as company owners to influence a
corporation’s behavior. Shareholder activism is generally classified into two categories (Socially-oriented shareholder
activism and Corporate governance activism). In the 1970s, religious investors formed a shareholder coalition called the
Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility, and started using the shareholder proposal process as a way of working
for peace and social justice. They began organizing and filing resolutions on South African Apartheid, community
economic development and global finance, environment, equality, international issues, health and militarism. Today,
shareholder resolutions cover a similar range of issues and are used by public interest-minded shareholders and their
allies to affect social change on a company-level. One of the more common issues addressed through shareholder
activism is the topic of corporate governance, or how a company structures and compensates its leadership,
particularly vis-a-vis shareholders’ rights. Shareholder Activism Handbook, Friends of the Earth, June 1999.
<http://www.foe. org/>.
2) In the case of the U.S., in 1985, the Council for Institutional Investors (CII) was formed to protect the financial
interests of its member investors and pension funds. The CII and its member groups are actively involved in studying and
promoting good corporate governance. See  generally, Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Pathways to Corporate Convergence? Two
Steps on The Road to Shareholder Capitalism in Germany,” Vol. 5, Columbia Journal of European Law (1999), p. 219;
John C. Coffee, “The Future As History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its
Implications,” Vol. 93, Northwestern University Law Review (1999), p. 641.
3) More specifically the Participatory Economy Committee within PSPD is in charge of these activities.
<http://www.peoplepower21.org/pec/>.
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in the decision making first of all by attending the shareholders’ meetings themselves
to express their views. Second, shareholders can make shareholder proposals to be
placed on the agenda of shareholders’ meetings and more formally make suggestions.
Third, shareholders can solicit proxies from other shareholders to promote their views.
Fourth, shareholders can convene extraordinary shareholders’ meetings. Based on
PSPD’s experience, these are the most fundamental and basic methods by which
shareholders can contribute in the decision-making process.  
A. Attending Shareholders’ Meetings
Shareholders’ meetings are the basic institutional forums where shareholders can
participate in the general corporate decision making process.6) At the shareholders’
meetings, the members of the board of directors and auditors are elected, the articles of
incorporations (“AOI”) are adopted or amended and major decisions such as mergers,
business transfers or dissolutions are decided by the shareholders.7) Financial
statements are also presented to the shareholders for their final approval.8) In addition,
shareholders’ meetings are a rare occasion where all shareholders can officially meet
the management, appraise their performance and raise questions regarding their
decisions. Despite the potential importance of shareholders’ meetings to minority
shareholders, in the past these meetings were largely formalities for Korean companies
including those that were publicly- held. Non-principal shareholders in particular
rarely attended the shareholders’ meetings. Except in those cases where hostile
takeovers were attempted, which only have occurred recently themselves, the meetings
were perfunctory formalities.
Several reasons existed for this state of affairs. First, non-principal shareholders
usually did not have any access to sufficient information about the agenda at the
shareholders’ meetings. Under the current Commercial Code, the shareholders can
Vol. 21, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law (2000), p. 273.
6) Robert G. Miller, “Comparing the Annual Shareholders Meeting in the United States With That In Germany-
Use of Yankee Concepts of Due Process Discerned by Alexis De Tocqueville,” Vol. 19, New York Law School
Journal of International and Comparative Law (1999), p 1 (offers a comparison of how shareholder meetings are
conducted in the U.S. and Germany).
7) Commercial Code, Art. 374, Art. 382.
8) Commercial Code, Art. 449.
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more significantly, it is believed that PSPD’s initiatives will have a lasting influence on
the Korean legal system governing corporate governance. For the first time, through
PSPD’s activities, various minority shareholders’ rights that had remained dormant for
most of Korea’s modern history were utilized. Although PSPD oftentimes relied on
social campaigns, negotiations and other non-legal activities to promote shareholder
rights, in the long run, one of its primary contributions toward strengthening corporate
governance in Korea was its ability to utilize legal measures.4)
This Article will examine how those involved in shareholder activism in Korea
have been able to use legal measures to improve corporate governance. It will
primarily draw upon the experience of PSPD’s activities in recent years. First, it will
begin by reviewing the basic legal measures that can be used to participate in the
corporate decision making process when it is initially being made. Next, the Article
will review how legal measures can be utilized to monitor the behavior of management
when it implements business decisions. Third, it will examine how legal measures can
be used to hold management accountable for their decisions, especially illegal conduct.
At each stage, this Article will examine the shortcomings that currently exist under the
current legal system as revealed in the course of PSPD’s activities. It will also offer
some possible regulatory and policy solutions to these various shortcomings. In the
end, this Article will attempt to show how these various legal measures functioned and
the influence that shareholder activism has had on corporate behavior and
strengthening corporate governance in Korea.
II. Participating in the Corporate Decision Making Process
Under the modern stock corporation model, shareholders delegate the detailed and
“day - to -day” decision making of the corporation to the board of directors.
Shareholders can nevertheless participate in the fundamental and basic corporate
decision making process through various legal measures.5) Shareholders can participate
4) Hwa-Jin Kim, “Living with the IMF: A New Approach to Corporate Governance and Regulation of Financial
Institutions in Korea,” Vol. 17, Berkeley Journal of International Law (1999), p 61, 71; As described by one foreign
observer, [PSPD’s] focus is working the system and the system [they] use is the legal system, launching lawsuits
against chaebols to recover misused funds. Times (London), June 23, 2000.
5) For a review of how many of the legal measures affecting corporate governance  have changed in recent years
see, Joon-Gi Kim, “Recent Amendments of Korean Commercial Code and Their Effect on International Competition,”
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unfortunately, these government authorities and regulators were often reluctant to share
information they obtained. PSPD at one point considered taking legal action for
refusing to provide such critical information that could affect the public interest.
Nevertheless, based upon the  information gathered, PSPD normally sent demands or
question lists to the management several days before the GSM to give the management
time to  prepare their responses.
Two weeks before the GSM, the corporate management is required to finalize the
meeting agenda and dispatch a meeting notice to the shareholders.12) Fo  smaller
shareholders, companies would often provide this public notice through the newspaper
instead of individually notifying shareholders.13) In the past, this meant that
shareholders therefore had to constantly check the notices in newspapers in order to
determine the date, place and agenda of the meetings. Starting from September 29,
2000, however, the dates and agenda of a general shareholders’ meeting became a
matter subject to a timely disclosure requirement.14) This will help shareholders and
PSPD to ascertain the details of shareholders’ meeting and to obtain proxies from
individual shareholders.
PSPD members attended GSMs and at the meetings raised questions on a variety of
issues.15) Questioning is useful in several aspects. First, shareholders can obtain
important information through quesioning. Surprisingly, the management has
sometimes openly admitted its negligence or malfeasance. In other cases, the
management provided important clues for further investigation. For example, when
PSPD questioned the board of Samsung Electronics regarding its indirect guarantee of
Samsung Motor’s offshore debts, the Chief Executive Officer surprisingly admitted
that he did not know about the transaction. This revealed that the Samsung Group
orchestrated these huge intra-group transactions without even notifying the head of
Samsung Electronics. 
Second, questioning can draw public attention to secret transactions such as unfair
11) Law No. 5242 of 1996.
12) Commercial Code, Art. 365.
13) Under Article 191-10 of SEA and Article 84-17 of its Implementing Decree, listed companies  can replace
individual notices to the shareholders who own less than 1% of the total outstanding shares with a public notice.
14) Regulation on Timely Disclosure and Prospectus of Listed Companies, Art. 4, Para. 1, Item 11.
15) PSPD main issues are well summarized in PSPD’s list of  demands. For reference, the items demanded for the
1998 shareholder meetings for Samsung Electronics and SK Telecom are included in the Annex.
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only obtain limited information such as agenda items and proposed amendments of the
AOI two weeks before the meeting by way of an individual or public notice. For listed
companies, a proxy statement with more detailed information should be maintained at
the company headquarters or with other related authorities such as the Korean Stock
Exchange under the Securities Exchange Act (“SEA”).9) But even such materials do
not include critical information such as the identity of the candidates for directors or
auditors or information on the management compensation. 
Second, in light of the ownership structure, it was difficult for non-principal
shareholders to directly influence the outcome of the meeting. In the case of chaebol
conglomerates, in particular, the principal shareholders maintained their control
through cross shareholding by related-sister companies even though their personal
stakes were extremely small. Third, institutional investors were barred from effectively
exercising their votes under the relevant laws.10) Fourth, proxy solicitation was rare
because the Korea Securities Depository was allowed to exercise voting rights of the
stocks that it held in custody and were undeclared. Thus, most shareholders did not
have any incentive to participate in the shareholders’ meetings. At the same time, this
meant that the management did not have any motivation to attract the minority
shareholders to attend the meetings.
PSPD engaged in a variety of activities at General Shareholders’ Meetings
(“GSM”). The most important activity by PSPD was to attend and to raise various
questions at the GSM. It was significant because this simple, but most basic
shareholder right was exercised in a meaningful manner for the first time. The
presence of shareholder activists such as PSPD, for instance,caused companies to
actually prepare their responses in earnest. 
PSPD, after it announced its plan to attend a company’s GSM, would prepare for
the meetings by first gathering available public information such as public disclosure
documents, media reports and financial statements. In certain cases, materials
produced by governmental authorities such as the Fair Trade Commission or Financial
Supervisory Service provided useful sources. PSPD often requested information from
regulators according to the Public Agency Information Disclosure Law.11) But,
9) Securities Exchange Act (SEA), Art. 191-10.
10) By a 1998 amendment of the Securities Investment Trust Business Act, securities investment trust companies
may now exercise their voting rights with certain restrictions.
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shareholder value and investor relations such shortsighted policies of disruption have
ostensibly disappeared.
B. Shareholder Proposals
Another important measure of shareholders has been the utilization of shareholder
proposals at the GSMs.19) Shareholder proposals allow shareholders to officially make
suggestions regarding a corporation’s operations. PSPD for instance first made
shareholder proposals at the GSMs of Samsung Electronics and SK Telecom. In
March 1998 and March 1999, PSPD proposed that the AOI of Samsung Electronics be
amended to protect the interests of minority shareholders. Also in March 1998, PSPD
made similar proposals to SK Telecom to amend its AOI and also proposed the
election of two outside directors. At the time, the proposals made to Samsung
Electronics failed to obtain majority approval, whereas in contrast the management
without even going to a proxy contest accepted many of PSPD’s proposals of SK
Telecom. Most notably, SK Telecom accepted the choices of the two outside directors
that were suggested and also an amendment to the AOI that certain interconglomerate
trades had to be reviewed by the outside directors.
Unfortunately, under Article 84-21 of the Presidential Decree of the SEA, which
governs listed companies, the type of proposals to the GSM agenda that can be made
by shareholders are strictly limited. These restrictions thwart basic shareholder
participation and action. For example, the dismissal of directors or auditors cannot be
the subject of a shareholder proposal. The only  way that shareholders may propose the
dismissal of a director or auditor is for them to convene an extraordinary shareholders’
meeting. In stark contrast, in the U.S. even such matters that are subject to business
judgment can be considered for discussion in the form of recommendatory resolutions.
But under the current laws of Korea, it is not likely that such resolutions can be
proposed by shareholders because the above mentioned Article suggests that a
proposal cannot contain any matter that does not explicitly belong to the authority of
shareholders’ meetings.
19) Christine L. Ayotte, “Reevaluating the Shareholder Proposal Rule in the Wake of Cracker Barrel and the Era
of Institutional Investors,” Vol. 48, Catholic University Law Review (1999), p.511; Daniel E. Lazaroff, “Promoting
Corporate Democracy and Social Responsibility: The Need to Reform the Federal Proxy Rules on Shareholder
Proposals,” Vol. 50, Rutgers Law Review (1997), p. 33 (on the importance of shareholder proposals).
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subsidies to affiliated companies or to family members of the controlling shareholder.
Where such issues are not widely known, the meeting provides an important forum
through which such details can be shared with shareholders or to the public at large.
Third, prepared questioning itself places a substantial degree of pressure on the part of
management. Management or directors in performing their duties will deliberate far
more as to whether their activities can be justified and will be more reluctant to
rubberstamp the decisions of the principal shareholder. Since PSPD first attended the
shareholders’ meeting of Korea First Bank in March 1997, PSPD members have
attended meetings of Samsung Electronics, Daewoo Corporation, SK Telecom,
Hyundai Heavy Industries, LG Semiconductor and Dacom. In one of the most
celebrated cases, the Samsung Electronics’ GSM that was held in March 1998 lasted
for more than 13 hours mainly due to thorough questioning by PSPD. 
When PSPD first initiated its minority shareholder campaign, the management of
some unenlightened companies even attempted to disrupt the attendance or
questioning of shareholders. PSPD brought legal actions on two different occasions to
nullify the resolutions passed at meetings where such disruptions occurred. The Korea
First Bank case and Hyundai Heavy Industries case offer interesting examples. Under
the Commercial Code, unlike most shareholder rights, only one share is required to
bring such a lawsuit. 
First, following the 1997 shareholders’ meeting of Korea First Bank, PSPD
brought an action claiming that the GSM should be nullified because the
management’s disruptions prevented proper shareholder participation. In December
1997, the Seoul District Court agreed and issued a decision to nullify the resolutions
adopted at the meeting. In the decision, the court confirmed the basic rights of
shareholders to raise questions and debate on the legitimacy of business judgments.16)
In contrast, in the case of Hyundai Heavy Industries’ 1999 GSM, the court dismissed
similar claims raised by PSPD.17) The court dismissed the case in order to “not damage
the company and to protect the transactional interests” that were based on such
resolutions even though the court found the process of reaching the resolution was
defective.18) Subsequently, as companies have grown to realize the importance of
16) Judgment of Dec. 12, 1997, Seoul District Court, 97 kahap 32890.
17) Judgment of Sept. 29, 2000, Busan High Court, 2000 na 4722.
18) Id.
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Under the regulations of the FSC, foreign shareholders can cast their votes only
through their local custodians using their standing proxies. Foreign shareholders in turn
do not have direct contact with their local custodians but relate with them through their
global custodians. Thus, in order for a foreign shareholder to grant their proxies to
PSPD, the foreign shareholders would have to instruct their global custodians to
instruct their local custodians to act accordingly. The general practice of global
custodians is to receive such instructions from the foreign shareholders at least 10 days
prior to the meetings. Thus, it was very difficult for foreign shareholders to give
proxies to PSPD because they would usually receive PSPD’s proxy statements after
they had sent their instructions to their global custodians. This rule therefore needs to
be amended so that the delivery of proxy statements can be made simultaneously with
the registration filing with the FSC.
D. Convening Extraordinary Shareholders’ Meetings
In close correlation with soliciting proxies and shareholder proposals, shareholders
can also convene Extraordinary Shareholders Meetings (“ESM”). PSPD, however, has
not attempted to convene an ESM. It is noteworthy that in the case of SK Telecom, an
outside auditor demanded the convening of an ESM under Article 412-3 of the
Commercial Code with  the support of PSPD. This is the first reported time that an
auditor exercised this right under this legal provision. The auditor convened the
meeting to raise issue with respect to a plan by SK Telecom to have a rights issue. SK
Telecom management announced that it would convene an ESM but at a date after the
capital increase took effect. The outside auditor filed a lawsuit to instantly convene the
meeting. The court unfortunately dismissed the outside auditor’s claim that the
meeting should be convened before the capital increase took effect.23) At the ESM so
convened, the management- led shareholders of SK Telecom with help from its
increased shareholding due to the capital increase were able to prevail at the meeting.
E. Policy Recommendations
First for shareholders to be able to more actively participate in shareholders’
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In the past, a major contradiction existed under the law. Shareholder proposals had
to be made six weeks prior to the convening of the GSM. In contrast, the GSM would
only be announced two weeks before it convened. This meant that in order for
shareholders to make a proposal they had to guess when the GSM was to going to be
convened and consequently make a shareholder proposal six weeks beforehand.
Fortunately, this legislative oversight was corrected in March 4, 2000 when the
Presidential Decree was modified to allow shareholders to make the proposal six
weeks before the same relative date that the GSM was held in the previous year.20) This
finally allows shareholders to know exactly when they can submit a shareholder
proposal.
C. Proxy Solicitations
Proxy solicitations are an important legal measure by which shareholders can seek
support from other minority shareholders.21) PSPD launched several proxy solicitations
to gather proxies from other shareholders. Under Article 199 of the SEA, anyone who
wants to solicit proxies from 10 or more persons must register the proxy statements in
advance with the Financial Supervisory Commission (“FSC”).22) The present
regulations have many obstacles for proxy solicitations to occur as explained below.
A meeting notice can only be dispatched to shareholders two days after a proxy
statement has been filed with the FSC. Since the GSM agenda are finalized two weeks
(14 days) before the meeting, shareholders had to send proxy solicitation materials to
other shareholders at best 12 days before the meeting. Of course, this assumes that
proxy solicitation materials can be fully prepared immediately upon receiving the
notice of the GSM orders. In the course of PSPD’s activities, this strict proxy rule
prevented PSPD from actively seeking proxies especially from foreign shareholders
that shared PSPD’s views.
20) Art. 84-21.
21) See generally, Douglas G. Smith, “A Comparative Analysis of The Proxy Machinery in Germany, Japan, and
the United States: Implications for the Political Theory of American Corporate Finance,” Vol. 58, University of
Pittsburgh Law Review, p.145 (1996); Daniel E. Lazaroff, “Promoting Corporate Democracy and Social
Responsibility: The Need to Reform the Federal Proxy Rules on Shareholder Proposals,” Vol. 50, Rutgers Law
Review, p. 33 (1997).
22) Presidential Decree of the SEA, Art, 85.
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23) Judgment of July 6, 1999, Seoul District Court, 99 pa 177.
especially to deter illegal or improper management decisions. Participating in the
shareholders’ meeting cannot prevent the management from subsequently taking
problematic business decisions because most managerial decisions are not subject to
prior approval of shareholders with a few exceptions such as mergers or business
transfers. The threat to bring derivative action has some preventive effect, but this often
takes time and is too late or remote. Thus, one of the major actions taken by PSPD was
to demand the end of illegal activities of the management or to require relevant
materials related to the business decisions to deter management from proceeding on
problematic decisions. Shareholders may also inspect the records of the corporation,
demand that certain management actions end or seek injunctions to prevent illegal
activities.
A. Inspection of Books and Records, Appointment of Inspectors
Inspection of books and records as provided in the KCC was utilized to gain
information for two purposes.25) First, inspections allow shareholders to gather critical
information necessary to prepare for the shareholders’ meeting. Second, inspections
help to get necessary information to pressure management into stopping illegal or
unreasonable decisions. Important records for instance can include Board of Directors’
minutes and accounting records.
In 1998, PSPD demanded the Board of Directors’ (“BOD”) minutes of Samsung
Electronics. This request was made in order to find evidence as to whether Samsung
Electronics illegally supported Samsung Motors and engaged in improper internal
transactions with Joongang Ilbo, a related company. Contrary to the shareholders’
legitimate rights guaranteed under the Commercial Code, Samsung Electronics
initially refused this basic request. A court order was sought to exercise this right and
on June 12, 1998 the Suwon District Court ordered Samsung Electronics to provide
the  minutes and pay a fine of three million won for violating the law.
In many other occasions, PSPD requested materials from the management of the
target companies before the meeting. Among these documents, the most  often
requested materials were audit reports of the companies conducted by  independent
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meetings the voting procedures must be improved. For instance, although as of
December 31, 1999, the new Commercial Code permits written voting, most
companies have not adopted it in their AOIs.24) Companies are reluctant to adopt this
voting method because of the added burden of including the voting and reference
material when sending the notice for convening the GSM. Furthermore, the Korea
Securities Depository (KSD) may still exercise the proxy votes for those undeclared
shareholders. Large companies such as Samsung Electronics have more than 100,000
shareholders and it is impossible to expect them to attend the GSM. Therefore it
should be mandatory for companies with more than a certain number of shareholders
to adopt the written voting procedures or in the alternative to consider such measures
as Internet voting. In addition, KSD should no longer be able to exercise proxies to
encourage companies to attract the participation of shareholders.
Second, the proxy statement sent to shareholders prior to the shareholders’
meetings must become more comprehensive. It should include the backgrounds of
those candidates to be-come directors or auditors, breakdowns of their individual
compensation and basic material explaining the corporations business and financial
condition. Moreover, this type of information should also be made available through
the Internet.
Third, the restrictions concerning shareholder proposals as provided in the SEA
should be modified. Shareholders should be allowed to propose the termination of
directors. Furthermore, shareholders should be able to propose any matter that can be
decided at a shareholders’ meeting and also should be able to make recommendatory
resolutions for those matters that have been delegated to the board of directors. Finally,
the proxy solicitation process must be simplified to allow the solicitation process to
begin immediately after filing the necessary material with the FSC. 
III. Preventive Measures and Monitoring the Behavior of
Management
After shareholders have delegated the corporate decision making process to the
board of directors, various legal measures are available for shareholders to monitor the
actions of management. Preventive measures such as monitoring are important
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24) Commercial Code, Art. 368-3.
25) Commercial Code, Art. 466; Randall S. Thomas, “ Improving Shareholder Monitoring of Corporate
Management by Expanding Statutory Access to Information,” Vol. 38, Arizona Law Review 331 (1996).
professional managers by giving them a useful tool to refuse improper demands driven
by controlling shareholders.
Nevertheless, in many cases the management of companies would not accept the
demands of PSPD. In most of these cases where shareholder demands are rejected,
however, the management would at least make changes to their original plans to avoid
the risk of a shareholder challenge or legal action. Hence, the demand did have an
effect on the management.26)
C. Injunctions to Prevent Illegal Acts of Management
Shareholders’ demands can also develop into more formal legal proceedings. In the
case of PSPD, it has filed injunctions to prevent management decisions from being
implemented. One notable case began in 1997. On March 24, 1997 Samsung
Electronics had a private placement of convertible bonds (“CB”) worth 60 billion won
(approximately $ 43 million) of which Samsung Group Chairman Keon-Hee Lee’s son
Jae-Yong Lee purchased 45 billion won and the Samsung Corporation purchased 15
billion won. The private placement of CB’s are different from public issues because
the issuing company can sell the bonds to particular designated individuals, making it
possible for only Jae-Yong Lee and Samsung Corporation to acquire these bonds.
PSPD believed that the private placement of CB’s was not only a means to pass on
the management control of the Samsung Group to Jae-Yong Lee but also violated the
preemptive rights of minority shareholders to purchase Samsung Electronics’ shares
and diluted their voting power. In addition, it argued that the conversion price was set
lower than the market price at the date of issue. This lower price further violated
shareholders’ interests because it was transferring company wealth to an individual.
Samsung claimed that the CBs were issued to Jae-Yong Lee because they needed the
capital and he was an accessible source under the circumstances.
As a result, PSPD filed a legal action on June 24, 1997 against Jae-Yong Lee and
Samsung Corporation to nullify Samsung Electronics’ issue of convertible bonds, and
filed a request for a temporary injunction against their conversion, sale or other
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accounting firms. These materials provided PSPD with information that they could use
to prepare questions and arguments.
Under the SEA, shareholders may request in writing inspection of books and
records. If the management denies such a request, the shareholders may apply for an
injunction order with the court. Furthermore, the shareholders may demand the
appointment of an inspector in certain circumstances. Although PSPD has not filed for
such an injunction, the existence of the right to inspect books and records functions as
an effective threat to press management to produce relevant materials.
B. Demands to Cease Illegal Activities
Shareholders can demand that management stop engaging in certain transactions
that are illegal or that unreasonably damage their interests. PSPD frequently used this
method to make demands. When making such demands, PSPD explained why it was
concerned with a particular transaction and urged an explanation and response from
the management. The management has no official obligation to respond to such a
demand from individual shareholders. Yet, even though the ultimate responsibility for
any business decision belongs to the management, a demand letter from a shareholder
sends a message to the management that if they proceeded with such a decision
without giving due consideration to the concerns raised by the shareholders, they could
be subject to legal action.
There were several cases where the management accepted the demands of PSPD.
In 1999, for instance, Hyundai Heavy Industries partly agreed to the demands made by
PSPD by withdrawing their plan to support Hyundai Motors for their acquisition of
Kia Motors and Asia Motors. Similarly, Samsung Electronics’ decision not to further
expand its automobile business was known partly due to objections raised by PSPD.
Ironically, on some occasions, PSPD’s demand letters served as the ostensible
reasons for the management of some chaebolcompanies to refuse requests for help
from their sister companies for fear of litigation. In the course of Hyundai Engineering
& Construction’s financial crisis last year, for instance, Hyundai Heavy Industries
refused a request for help from the Hyundai Group because PSPD and minority
shareholders opposed such a subsidy. Some critics suggest that such “interference” by
PSPD limits the creative and challenging business decisions of the professional
managers. But, in reality, PSPD’s involvement grants more authority and discretion to
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26) In the case of SK Telecom, PSPD and outside directors raised objections to the management’s plan for the
purchase of certain real estate from one of its sister companies. Although PSPD and outside directors could not prevent
the purchase of the real estate, the outside directors did force the management to modify the terms and conditions for
the purchase.
late to correct or retract such illegal activities because they have progressed too far. In
the case of Samsung Motors, for instance, PSPD filed an injunction to prevent
Samsung Electronics from repaying the debts of Samsung Motors. But this injunction
was filed after it became public knowledge that the BOD had agreed to assume a
portion of these debts. Even if the injunction is accepted by the courts, it is
questionable as to whether Samsung Electronics can retract its promise with the
creditors of Samsung Motors. Similarly, in the case of the injunction to prevent the
conversion of the Samsung Electronics’ convertible bonds, it became all but
meaningless when the bonds in question were converted the day before the court’s
decision. One solution is to strengthen the disclosure requirement. The injunction
process can alternatively be accelerated. But these options have their limitations. Given
the circumstances in Korea, one of the best hopes to properly restrict the managerial
agency problem is make cumulative voting mandatory and elect more independent
directors on the board. 
IV. Holding Management Accountable for Their Conduct
Management can be held accountable for its action in several ways. When the
management has contributed to the improvement of the corporation of course they can
be rewarded with increased compensation and reappointment as managers. In contrast,
when the management has harmed the corporation either through negligence or
malfeasance they can be held responsible for their misdeeds by way of being replaced
with a new management. In fact, the primary reason why management pays careful
attention to the voices of shareholders is because shareholders may end their
employment if it is deemed unsatisfactory. But in the case of most Korean
corporations, the management was always selected by the principal shareholders and
they were effectively free from any challenges of other shareholders. Thus, in Korea,
legal measures to hold the management legally liable for its conduct are essential for
the board to be responsive to the needs of all shareholders and not just the principal
shareholder. Shareholders can file shareholder derivative actions seeking liability
against directors or auditors.28) Administrative or criminal complaints can be raised
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disposition. On September 30, the court approved the request for a temporary
injunction against Samsung Electronics. However, the day before the court’s ruling,
Samsung Corporation made a sudden move to convert the CB’s to shares.
In response, on October 7, PSPD requested a temporary injunction against the
disposition or listing of Jae-Yong Lee and Samsung Corporations’ newly converted
shares, and modified the compliant to one that sought to “nullify the issue of
convertible bonds” to one that sought to “nullify the issue of new shares.” On
December 17, 1997, the Suwon District Court ruled in favor of PSPD’s claim with
regard to the temporary injunction against the disposition or listing of Jae-Yong Lee’s
shares. In the opinion issuing the temporary injunction, the court  stated that for a
private placement of convertible bonds to a third party or a particular shareholder,
“there must be an objective legitimate reason.” Furthermore, the court announced that
in issuing the convertible bonds to Jae-Yong Lee as an individual in this case, “the
need for capital was only a superficial reason and the only reason was for the interests
of the dominant shareholder; hence, it should be void.” The Suwon District Court,
however, ruled against the actual nullification of the newly issued shares. PSPD
immediately appealed this point.27)
In another case involving Samsung Electronics, PSPD filed an injunction to
prevent it from supporting Samsung Motors. At the time, Samsung Electronics was not
under any guarantee agreement with Samsung Motors, but it was supposed to assume
the responsibilities for a part of the debt of Samsung Motors, following an agreement
by the creditors of Samsung Motors after it became defunct. PSPD raised an apparent
objection and sent an opinion letter to the board of Samsung Electronics. Then in
November 2000, PSPD filed for an injunction to stop the implementation of this
agreement with creditors of Samsung Motors. This injunction is still pending review.
D. Policy Recommendations
For shareholders to prevent the malfeasance and misappropriation of managers,
information concerning the corporation must be provided promptly. At the same time,
the courts must respond more quickly to injunctions. Otherwise, it often becomes too
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27) The Seoul High Court subsequently affirmed the decision not to nullify the newly issued shares. see, Seoul
High Count, 98 na 4608. (Ed. Note:This decision is provided in the materials section in this issue). 
28) Robert B. Thompson, “Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: Protecting 
Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue,” Vol. 62, Law and Contemporary Problems Summer (1999), p. 252
(emphasizing that “exit and litigation” are “core governance functions” for shareholders).
business discretion and decision making of managers.31) But, the article did not explain
why receiving a bribe or instructing employees to avoid internal risk control
regulations constituted a legitimate business judgment that should be protected. These
types of actions do not deserve protection under any legal system.
In October 1998, PSPD filed another derivative action against eleven board
members of Samsung Electronics on behalf of 22 shareholders. In the complaint,
shareholders alleged that the company was damaged due to a variety of illegal
behavior of the management. These acts  included bribery to a former President, illegal
intercorporate transactions with sister companies, Joongang Ilbo, Samsung
Corporation and Samsung Heavy Industries, capital injections and bank guarantees to
Ichon Electronics and sales of holding securities at a lower than  market price to two
other subsidiaries. These various wrongdoings were based upon facts that were already
revealed in a criminal investigation or investigation by the Fair Trade Commission.
Following another government investigation, PSPD initiated a shareholders’
derivative suit against the Daewoo Corporation to request compensation for 23 billion
won ($ 20 million). This claim was primarily the result of improper intercorate
transactions by the conglomerate chairman, Woo-Chung Kim, and senior managers, in
1998. This civil action is currently pending judicial review.
B. Criminal or Administrative Complaints
Shareholders can also resort to seeking criminal or administrative investigations to
seek the accountability of management. Civil lawsuits can be time consuming and it is
particularly difficult to obtain enough evidence to prevail in litigation because of the
lack of civil discovery in Korea. In many of its cases, therefore PSPD chose to pursue
criminal or administrative complaints. This avenue must be proceeded with caution,
however, because criminal complaints have negative consequences as well. First, they
will close the door  for future negotiation possibilities, when compared to civil
proceeding. Moreover, the involvement of the shareholders is limited after the issue
has been raised. In the end, it was unfortunate that in many cases the prosecutors’ office
or Fair Trade Commission was reluctant to aggressively pursue cases brought by PSPD. 
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against the management. 
In this regard, PSPD’s activities were successful because PSPD did not merely
make demands to target companies or just commence street campaigns to criticize the
management. PSPD was careful to make very specific but  achievable demands. If the
management did not accept the demands, only then would PSPD consider the second
phase of actions such as bringing shareholder derivative actions or criminal
complaints. Negative campaigns are risky because PSPD itself is then forced to make
determinations on matters intertwined with business judgments. But, if PSPD initiates
legal proceedings such as shareholder derivative suits or criminal complaints, the court
becomes the one that judges the propriety of managerial business decisions. Some
criticized that PSPD challenged decisions that belonged to the business judgment and
discretion of the management. But such suggestions are rather exaggerated because
PSPD was careful to only focus its activities against those management decisions that
involved egregious improprieties.
A. Shareholder Derivative Actions
The earliest example of a shareholder derivative suit occurred on June 3, 1997,
when PSPD initiated an action against former officers of Korea First Bank (KFB).29)
PSPD brought the claim on behalf of 61 minority shareholders of KFB. The plaintiffs
claimed 40 billion won in compensation against the former president and directors of
KFB. It was alleged that they received bribes in return for providing credit to the failed
Hanbo conglomerate, causing critical losses to the bank and its shareholders. Through
criminal inspections, these allegations were substantiated through evidence that the
former president and directors not only received bribes but they instructed staff
employees to neglect internal regulations to extend huge loans to Hanbo even right
before it went bankrupt. On July 24, 1998, the Seoul District Court ruled in favor of
these minority shareholders issuing a historical 40 billion won money award against
these directors.30)
Right after the decision, however, a senior researcher of the Free Enterprise
Institute wrote an article arguing that this court decision would limit the legitimate
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“The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits,” Vol. 65, Brooklyn Law Review (1999), p. 3. 
30) Judgment of Jul. 24, 1988, Seoul District Court, 98 Kahap 39907.
31) Jeong-Ho Kim, Reviewing the First Shareholder’s Representitve Action [Chutbunzzae Juju Daepyososong eul
Bomyunseo], Free Enterprise Institute (Jul, 29, 1998).
foreign currencies, and loans made to employees. This case became a hallmark to
prevent many prevailing accounting practices. In connection with Hyundai
Electronics’ illegal manipulation of the stock prices, the Judiciary Monitoring Center
of PSPD filed a complaint that the lawyers representing Hyundai Electronics aided the
officers of Hyundai companies in concealing their criminal behavior. Hence
accountability has been sought not only against directors but also against attorneys and
accountants that assist in illegal endeavors.
PSPD has also on several occasions requested investigations by the Fair Trade
Commission. PSPD for instance requested a Fair Trade Commission investigation into
Samsung Electronics’ alleged illicit support to Seoul Commtech on September 18,
2000. Samsung Electronics under its corporate reform program, transferred the asset
and business licenses related to “Home Network” to Seoul Commtech at a price below
market value from 1998 to 1999, giving huge profit gains to the communication
technology company. It is suspected that this transaction was a means to transfer the
chairman’s wealth and power to his son. Jae-Yong Lee later became the largest
shareholder of Seoul Commtech by purchasing convertible bonds issued by the
company in 1996. As of the end of 1999, sixty percent of the Seoul Commtech’s
revenue was generated by transactions with Samsung Electronics. The suspicion is
strongly supported by the fact that the company’s gross revenue has dramatically
increased since it officially became affiliated with the  Samsung Group.
On September 8, 2000, PSPD also asked the Fair Trade Commission to probe into
Samsung Group’s father-to-son wealth transfers through several other companies.
More specifically, PSPD demanded investigations by the Fair Trade Commission into
eight start-up companies, e-Samsung, e-Samsung International, CQI.Com, BankPool
LTD, ValueNetwork LTD, Innis LTD, Fn-Guide LTD and Insvally. They are also
suspected of being used to pass the chairman’s wealth to his son who was recognized
as the largest shareholder of these companies.
C. Demanding the Dismissal of Responsible Officers.
Under the Comnercial code shareholders have the right to terminate directors before
the end of their term.32) At present, this requires a special resolution and there must be a
Journal of Korean Law, Vol.1, No.1, 2001
71
An example occurred on June 11, 1998 when PSPD filed a criminal complaint with
the Seoul District Prosecutors’ Office charging Samsung Electronics, Samsung
Display Devices, Samsung Electro-Mechanics, Samsung Motors and the board
members of each company for violating laws regulating the introduction of foreign
capital, foreign currency management laws, and securities transactions laws. Samsung
Electronics, Samsung Display Devices, and Samsung Electro-Mechanics, which are
the main shareholders of Samsung Motors, made a joint investment agreement with an
Ireland-based paper company called Pan-Pacific Industrial Investments (PP) to invest
approximately $280.2 million in Samsung Motors. This agreement is in the form of a
direct investment by a foreigner in accordance with the laws regulating the
introduction of foreign capital. However, unlike a direct investment, a certain rate of
return is guaranteed with put and call options and a specified redemption period exists.
Samsung Motors therefore in effect brought in an offshore commercial loan with
guarantees from three affiliates not a direct investment as was clained.
According to the laws regulating the introduction of foreign capital and foreign
currency management laws at the time, the introduction of commercial loans required
the approval of the Finance Minister. Because it was not possible to follow the
necessary legal procedure for bringing in a commercial loan, Samsung Motors resorted
to circumventing this regulation by disguising the funds as a direct investment. In its
notification, Samsung omitted the parts that could reveal the commercial loan
character and made separate side agreements. In effect, Samsung made a false
notification, in violation of the above-mentioned laws, and also violated the SEA
provisions requiring public disclosure of important capital transactions. Nevertheless,
the Seoul District Prosecutor’s Office without even investigating the actual process of
such agreement ended the investigation.  
PSPD sometimes brought administrative complaints against professionals such as
accountants or lawyers who aided in the illegal or improper activities of the
management. PSPD revealed that the financial statements as reported at the 1998 GSM
were not in compliance with the Korean Accounting Standards and filed a complaint
with the Financial Supervisory Service on April 16th. Both Samsung Electronics and
Samil Accounting firm, the outsider auditor of the company, received a warning from
the government agency due to insufficient reporting and careless auditing.  In the
financial statements and the audit reports, both did not specify stock option trading that
occurred with Samsung Motors, losses and gains from assets and debt denoted by
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much has yet to be achieved. Korea, for instance, is still debating the contours of how
to allow securities-related class actions and whether to make cumulative voting
mandatory for the election of directors. Given Korea’s unique situation, which is
similar to many other countries in East Asia, these reforms are among a host of
measures that need to be adopted to enhance the effectiveness of corporate
governance. In the meantime, shareholder activists in Korea wait for the day when
Korean corporations will not resist but will instead openly compete with each other on
how to strengthen their corporate governance and will be proud of it.
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reasonable cause for the termination or the terminated director make seek
compensation from the company. This measure has been rarely used for two reasons.
First, from the perspective of principal shareholders they do not need to utilize this
provision. Second, the ownership requirements needed for a special resolution are
extremely high.
D. Policy Recommendations
In Korea, shareholder derivative suits against publicly-held companies still require
0.01 percent of the outstanding stock.33) At the same time, awards from a shareholder
derivative action are paid to the corporation. Given these limitations, it is difficult to
expect private enforcement through shareholder derivative actions to be effective.
Therefore, to allow shareholders to directly receive compensation and press claims
against managers for their malfeasance, it is critical that Korea permits class action
litigation. Shareholders should also be able to terminate improper directors with only a
standard voting quorum and not through a special super-majority requirement.
Another option that should be considered is to reduce the terms of directors from three
years to one year so that shareholders can easily replace those who harm their interests.
V. Conclusions
While shareholder activism or even basic management monitoring mechanisms can
take many forms, it still remains at a preliminary stage in Korea when compared to
other advanced countries. Public interest organizations involved in shareholder
activism such as PSPD have tried to educate investors and management toward the
importance of protecting shareholder rights. In order to strengthen corporate
governance, they have emphasized the importance of participating and monitoring in
the decision-making of management and holding them accountable after the fact.
PSPD in the process has used a host of legal measures that previously remained
dormant. PSPD’s activities offer an example for other developing countries that face
similar corporate governance problems as to how important it is to use the rule of law.
Despite the recent increase in shareholder activism, many obstacles still remain and
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guarantees it has made, explain why they were provided, and show how they plan to
terminate them. In addition, management must provide a detailed update of the current
status of SEC’s foreign investments and their future feasibility. 
5. Reassignment of SEC Personnel Assigned to, and Disclosure of Financial Support
Provided to, the Samsung Group’s Office of the Executive Staff 
The Samsung Group’s Office of the Executive Staff operates for the Chairman of the
entire Samsung conglomerate, yet it has no legal basis. The interests of SEC
shareholders are being harmed to the extent personnel and funds that should be used
for the benefit of SEC are being devoted to assist a Chairman who is technically not
accountable to anyone. SEC management should disclose the extent to which it has
assigned personnel and expended funds to the Office of the Executive Staff. These
SEC staff members and funds should be withdrawn and  all funds improperly
expended thusfar should be returned to SEC.
6. To comply with the various February 6, 1998 requirements set by the government,
SEC must amend its articles of incorporation and appoint outside directors and
auditors. Among the outside directors and auditors appointed, a certain portion should
represent the interests of minority shareholders. In addition, to improve the corporate
governance of SEC, the attached amendments to the articles of incorporation as
proposed by PSPD should be adopted to the fullest extent. 
7. Termination of Directors for Misconduct 
The entire board of directors should assume responsibility for mismanagement of the
company and outside directors and auditors should be elected at the upcoming annual
shareholder meeting. Those directors involved with the improper private placement of
convertible shares and the improper dealing with Joongang Ilbo must resign.
PSPD’s List of Demands for SK Telecom’s 1998 GSM
1. Resignation of Directors Involved in Improper Dealing 
Those directors involved in the improper dealing as determined by the Fair Trade
Commission must submit their resignation or be terminated at the upcoming GSM. In
particular, the following directors must be terminated: Kil-Sung Sohn, SKT Vice-
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Annex
PSPD’s List of Demands for Samsung Electronics Corporation’s 
(SEC) 1998 GSM 
1. Convertible Bonds Issued on March 24, 1997 
The stocks issued to Jae-yong Lee and the Samsung Corporation should be cancelled
and sold. Any profit earned from the sale of such stock should be returned to the
company or donated to the company’s unemployment fund. 
2. SEC’s Investments in Samsung Motors 
As of December 31, 1996, SEC has invested over 170  billion won ($ 106 million) in
Samsung  Motors and owns 24.81% or 34 million of its shares. Samsung Motors’
prospects remain unclear and it is expected that they will continue to have a deficit at
least  until the year  2000. After investing  these tremendous sums into Samsung
Motors, SEC now is having difficulty gaining funds due to the constricted financial
market and the depressed semiconductor market. SEC’s 1996 sales declined by 1.95%
from the previous year. The management of SEC therefore must disclose the
profitability prospects of Samsung Motors and, if uncertain, all investments must be
withdrawn and additional investments or guarantees must cease. 
3. SEC’s Improper Dealing with the Joongang Ilbo Publishing Company 
SEC improperly transferred its corporate funds to one of its sister companies, the
publishing company Joongang Ilbo. This was done by paying excessive fees for ads it
placed in the newspaper and the magazine Win that was also run by the company. In
this case, SEC paid up to more than 73% of the going market rate and in the magazine
Win it paid 30% more on average. The Fair Trade Commission ordered SEC to take
corrective action as a result of these overpayments. SEC must explore means to have
these improperly transferred funds returned back to SEC.
4. SEC’s Debt Guarantees of Sister Companies and Foreign Investment 
As of June 1997, SEC has guaranteed 720 billion won ($450  million) of the debt of its
sister companies and has invested over 2.2 trillion won ($ 1.375 billion) in foreign
companies. SEC’s management should provide a detailed summary of the various debt
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Korean Criminal Law: 
Moralist Prima Ratiofor Social Control
Kuk Cho*
Abstract
The fundamental framework of the Korean Penal Code has remained unchanged for half a century.
However, a large number of special criminal acts armed with heavier punishments have been legislated.
Since democratization, the question of whether the provisions of Korean criminal law are against “nullum
crimen, nulla poena sine lege” has been taken more seriously. Arguments for the liberalization or “de-
criminalization” of Korean criminal law have proliferated. However, there is still a trend toward “over-
criminalization”, and heavier punishment is still preferred for social control. Without serious debate over
the legitimacy of subjecting citizens to double jeopardy, “protective security measures” are imposed upon
citizens who have already served their sentences. Criminal law is “prima ratio,” not “ultima ratio,” for
social control in Korean society. Korean criminal law reform must attempt to perform two seemingly
contradicting tasks: it must not only de-criminalize the over-criminalized criminal law, it must also
provide a blueprint for solving the worsening crime problem in modern Korean society.
* Professor of Law, Dongguk University.
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Chairman (with authority to represent the company) and SKC’s Head of the Office of
Coordination and Management Planning; Jin-Mo Choi, Managing Director in Charge
of Finance; In-Pyo Lee, Inside Auditor; and, Hae-Yong Choi, Outside Auditor. 
2. Taehan Telecom should be merged with SKT but Taehan Telecom’s stock price
should be valued at 400 won pershare so that Tae-Won Choi and Joon-Il Kim do not
profit from the transaction. 
3. SKT must end its terminal supply contract with SK Distribution, and management
must provide a specific plan to redeem the 5.7 billion won ($ 3.5 million) that was
transferred to SK Distribution. 
4. SKT’s unilateral contracts with SK Engineering and Construction (“SKEC”) must
be terminated and management must provide a specific plan to redeem the excessive
profit transferred to SKEC. The excessive profits of approximately 7.5 billion won ($
4.7 million) that SKEC received is based on that amount over 11.5% which is the
average profit margin based on the construction industry’s sales.
5. To comply with the various new February 6, 1998 regulations, SKT must amend its
articles of incorporation and appoint outside directors and auditors.  Among the outside
directors and auditors appointed, a certain portion must represent the interests of
minority shareholders. In addition, to improve the corporate governance of SKT, the
attached amendments to the articles of incorporation as proposed by PSPD should be
adopted to the fullest extent.
6. SKT should implement a stock split to facilitate investment by minority
shareholders and to increase liquidity,
7. SKT’s accountants Ahngun Accounting must be terminated for their failure to
prevent the improper dealing practices and their poor accounting and auditing. 
8. SKT must not participate in its sister company SK Securities’ planned private stock
issuance if SK Securities’ financial status is questionable.
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